The Federalist Papers: who's who, timeline and places

Publius urges New York citizens to judge the proposed Constitution reasonably and declares his support for adoption.

Jay argues that a united national government reduces legitimate causes of foreign war.

Hamilton warns that ambition, commercial rivalry, and private motives can drive separated States into conflict.

Madison presents representation and a large Union as protections against majority oppression.

Hamilton identifies dependence on state obedience as the Confederation's central defect.

Publius uses the United Netherlands to show how sovereign provinces weaken their common government.

Publius argues that national duties require sufficient powers, especially for unpredictable defense needs.

Hamilton defends national militia regulation while preserving state appointment of officers.

Hamilton argues that States retain independent taxing authority except for restrictions concerning imports and exports.

Madison explains the convention's difficulties in balancing effective government, republican liberty, and competing interests.

Madison presents the proposed Constitution as republican and as combining national and federal features.

Madison defends federal powers over foreign relations and interstate commerce as repairs to weaknesses in the Confederation.

Madison argues that popular attachments, state influence, and an armed militia can resist federal encroachment.

Madison explains how internal checks and divided authority protect against concentrated power and unjust majorities.

Madison defends the compromise counting enslaved people at three-fifths when distributing representatives and direct taxes.

Publius defends congressional control of election rules as protection against states preventing federal elections.

Madison defends the Senate's selection, equal state representation, and stability as checks on legislation.

Hamilton defends temporary presidential electors as safeguards against corruption, foreign influence, and disorder.

Publius argues that a single executive supports effective action and makes responsibility for misconduct clear.

Hamilton defends presidential nominations with Senate approval as a way to combine responsibility with checks on unsuitable appointments.

Hamilton argues that independent judges must reject statutes that conflict with the Constitution.

Publius argues that constitutional silence about civil juries does not abolish them.

Hamilton argues that existing constitutional safeguards make a separate bill of rights unnecessary and potentially dangerous.

Hamilton urges adoption despite imperfections and argues that amendments will be easier after approval.