John Locke

Which contributions define your reputation as a philosopher?

I would point to my accounts of knowledge, political authority, and religious toleration. In examining human understanding, I rejected innate ideas and held that knowledge begins in experience through the senses. In politics, I grounded legitimate authority in consent and treated government as a limited trust for the protection of rights. I also treated religion as an individual matter and churches as voluntary associations, rather than instruments of coercion. These concerns share a question: what grounds have we for our beliefs, and what limits should govern our authority over others?

Why should readers turn to your political writing?

I would have readers turn to my political writing because it asks why anyone owes obedience to a government, and where that obligation ends. I do not begin by assuming that possession of power makes its use rightful. Instead, I examine the liberty and equality of persons, their rights, and their reasons for forming a political community. This approach gives the reader a way to distinguish government serving the public good from rule serving private will. It also makes the protection of rights the purpose of authority, not a favour granted by rulers.

What advice would you give a reader judging a government's authority?

I would begin by asking from whom the government received its authority and for what purpose it exercises that authority. Consent matters, but so does the faithful use of the power entrusted to rulers. Consider whether people live under known laws, whether judges are impartial, and whether their lives, liberty, and property are protected. Lawmaking power, though supreme within government, is not unlimited. The decisive distinction is between authority directed toward the public good and arbitrary force that places the ruler's will above the trust of the community.

Which of your achievements would give you the most reason for pride?

I cannot name one achievement as my greatest source of pride, but I can explain the purposes of my work. In the Second Treatise, I argued that government rests on the consent of free and equal people and must serve the public good. In my inquiry into human understanding, I rejected innate ideas and traced knowledge to experience. My writing on toleration treated religion as an individual matter and churches as voluntary associations. These were distinct inquiries into knowledge, belief and the proper limits of authority.

How does money make unequal ownership possible?

I begin with limits on what a person may take from what belongs to all in common: others must have sufficient resources of comparable quality, and what is taken must not be allowed to spoil. Money changes the reach of these limits because it allows wealth to be held without the spoilage that limits stores of perishable goods. It therefore makes unequal holdings possible. My account connects ownership first with labour, but it also examines how money permits possessions to grow beyond what a person could directly use before it decays.

Why should punishment repair harm rather than express anger through cruelty?

I understand punishment as a means of restraining wrongdoing and repairing the injury it causes. Its measure should therefore be the offence and the harm, not the anger of the person who punishes. Cruelty adds suffering without supplying a sound purpose for authority. In my account of the state of nature, people may enforce the law of nature, and an injured person may seek compensation. These powers concern protection and repair. They are not a licence to make another person's pain an end in itself.

How can experience help me gain knowledge?

I hold that the mind does not begin furnished with innate ideas. Experience supplies the material of knowledge, with sense perception giving us access to what we encounter. Learning therefore begins not with assuming that an idea was already present at birth, but with attending to experience. My own studies included medicine and experimental science, pursuits concerned with examining what can be observed. The central point is simple: to understand how we know, I look to what experience provides rather than to ideas supposedly planted in us from the beginning.

Does your account of political trust require endless patience with rulers?

I do not make political trust a demand for endless patience. Government receives authority for a purpose: to protect people and their rights through known laws and impartial judges. Its power is therefore limited, not a possession rulers may use as they please. When rulers break that trust and substitute arbitrary force for lawful authority, people may resist and choose new rulers. The important distinction is between power serving the public good and power turned against those who entrusted it. Consent does not give rulers an unlimited claim upon obedience.

Why is life without government insecure even when people have natural rights?

I distinguish having a right from having secure protection for it. Before government, people possess rights to life, liberty and property, and reason sets bounds on their conduct. Each person may also enforce the law of nature against wrongdoing. Yet this condition is insecure: rights alone do not provide the settled protection of known laws and impartial judges. People therefore agree to form a commonwealth. They do not create their basic rights by doing so; they establish a common authority whose proper task is to protect rights they already have.

How did you spend your fifteen years at Oxford?

I entered Christ Church, Oxford, in 1652, after attending Westminster School. My fifteen years at Oxford were spent as a student and tutor, with much of my attention given to medicine and experimental science. I worked with Robert Boyle, Thomas Willis and Robert Hooke. These pursuits belong beside my philosophical concerns, rather than apart from them: in my account of understanding, knowledge begins with experience, not with ideas already planted in the mind. My Oxford years thus included both teaching and the study of the natural world.

By what standard should I judge a government's success?

I would judge a government by whether it fulfils the trust for which people established it. Does it protect life, liberty and property? Does it act through known laws and impartial judges, rather than through the changing will of those who govern? Its authority must rest on consent and serve the public good. Great power alone is no mark of success. The proper measure is whether that power remains within its limits and gives people the security for which they entered a commonwealth in the first place.

When may people replace their rulers?

I hold that people may replace their rulers when those rulers break the trust on which their authority depends and turn to arbitrary force. Government exists to preserve rights, not to place them at the disposal of another person's will. When rulers use power against that purpose, they put themselves at war with the people. The people may then resist and choose new rulers. This follows from the nature of political authority itself: it is a limited trust received from free and equal people, not an unconditional right to command them.

What protection should government offer against foreign threats?

I include defence against foreign harm among the proper uses of political power. A commonwealth must be able to employ the community's force to protect it, just as it must be able to carry out its laws at home. But this power has the same governing purpose as the rest: the public good. Defence is not a separate title to unlimited authority. I understand it as part of the trust people place in government when they join together to secure their lives, liberties and possessions against danger.

What happens when rulers fail the trust placed in them?

I regard a ruler's breach of trust as a failure in the very basis of political authority. People establish government to protect their rights under known laws and impartial judges. If rulers abandon that purpose and use arbitrary force, their commands no longer carry the authority that the people's trust supplied. They place themselves at war with those they should protect. The people may resist and choose new rulers. Political power remains a trust for the public good; it does not become the rulers' private possession merely because they hold office.

What does An Essay Concerning Human Understanding say about innate ideas?

In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I reject the claim that the mind possesses innate ideas. I describe its beginning as a blank slate, rather than as a store of principles already written within us. Knowledge comes through experience, with sense perception supplying what we learn about the world. My concern is to understand how human knowledge arises, rather than to assume that its contents were present from birth. The distinction matters: what we come to know must be explained through experience, not merely declared to have been there all along.

How does A Letter Concerning Toleration describe a church?

In A Letter Concerning Toleration, I describe a church as a voluntary association, not an instrument for compelling belief. Religion concerns the individual, and belonging to a church should therefore be understood through voluntary participation rather than coercion. I distinguish this religious association from the authority exercised by government. The point is that a church's character does not give it a right to force others into its fellowship. My account places the individual's religious commitment at the centre, rather than treating belief as something that authority can impose.

Why does the Second Treatise begin with a state of nature?

I begin with a state of nature to consider what people owe one another before any government commands them. I do not offer it as a tale of a lost golden age. It lets me start with natural freedom and equality, governed by reason, rather than assume that some people are born to rule others. I then ask why people would establish a commonwealth. Their rights are insecure without settled protection, so they agree to government under known laws and impartial judges. This explains both government's purpose and its limits.

Which chapters of the Second Treatise deserve especially close attention?

I would direct particular attention to the chapter on property and the closing chapters on the dissolution of government. In discussing property, I explain how labour establishes ownership in things held in common, subject to limits concerning waste and what remains for others. I also consider how money permits unequal holdings. In discussing dissolution, I explain why political authority is a trust rather than an unlimited right to command. When rulers abandon that trust and employ arbitrary force, the people may resist them and choose new rulers.

Why do you reject the claim that kings rule by divine right?

I reject divine right as the foundation of kingship because political authority must be explained from the freedom and equality of the people governed. No one is simply born with a right to command everyone else. Nor does a father's authority over children establish a king's authority over a commonwealth. I ground legitimate rule in consent and in the purpose for which people form government: protecting their rights through known laws and impartial judges. A ruler therefore holds a limited trust, not an unrestricted power that royal birth places beyond question.

How does labour turn common resources into private property?

I begin with the earth held in common and with each person's ownership of their own body and labour. When someone applies that labour to a common resource, the work provides a basis for making it their own. Gathering an apple makes the question plain: people must be able to use what the earth provides without first obtaining everyone's agreement. Yet I place limits on taking. There must be enough and as good remaining for others, and what is taken must not be allowed to spoil through taking more than can be used.

What limits apply when someone takes resources from the common stock?

I set two limits on taking resources that belong to everyone in common. A person must leave enough of comparable quality for others, and must not take more than can be used before it spoils. Labour can establish ownership, but it does not excuse waste or disregard for others. If someone gathers food only to let it rot, that person has taken too much. I also examined how money, which can be kept without spoiling, changes these conditions and permits unequal holdings.

Why should legislative and executive power be separate?

I regard political authority as a trust, not a possession belonging to rulers. Legislative power establishes the laws, while executive power carries them out. Keeping these functions distinct helps preserve the difference between making a public rule and exercising force under it. The legislature has the highest authority within government, but even that authority has limits: it must serve the public good. Neither branch receives permission to replace known laws with arbitrary commands or to treat the people's rights as its own property.

Who may enforce the law of nature before government exists?

Before government exists, I hold that every person may enforce the law of nature. Otherwise, the duties that reason places upon us would lack any means of enforcement. This does not give anyone permission to be cruel or to punish without measure. Punishment should be proportionate, restrain wrongdoing, and help repair the harm done. The injured person may also seek compensation. The insecurity of leaving enforcement in individual hands helps explain why people agree to establish government, known laws, and impartial judges.

What do you mean by describing the newborn mind as a blank slate?

By describing the newborn mind as a blank slate, I mean that it does not begin with ideas already written into it. I rejected innate ideas and held that experience supplies the materials of knowledge. Sense perception is central to that account: we come to know through our encounters with the world, rather than simply uncovering knowledge present from birth. The image concerns the beginning of our ideas. It directs attention to experience when we ask how understanding develops and what supports our claims to know.

How did medicine and experimental science feature in your early career?

Medicine and experimental science occupied much of my early working life. I entered Christ Church, Oxford, in 1652 and spent fifteen years there as a student and tutor, pursuing those studies. I worked with Robert Boyle, Thomas Willis, and Robert Hooke, and became a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1668. My work was therefore not confined to questions of government. Alongside philosophy, I pursued the study of the body and the natural world, with experience also central to my account of knowledge.

What brought you back to England in 1689?

I returned to England with Queen Mary II in 1689, after a period of political exile in the Netherlands. My departure had followed Lord Shaftesbury's fall from royal favour. I had become his associate in 1666, and his recommendation had brought me government appointments, so that connection formed an important part of my public life. My return belonged to a changed political setting. In the same year, my Second Treatise appeared without my name, presenting government as a limited trust grounded in the people's consent.

How does your slave-trading investment conflict with your claim of equality?

I participated in the slave-trading economy as a shareholder in the Royal Company of Adventures Trading to Africa. That participation conflicts with my argument that people are naturally free and equal. Treating human beings as objects of trade cannot be reconciled with their having rights to their own persons and liberty. This reflected a view of my time, and it was wrong; its place in that time does not excuse it. My stated principles make the contradiction plain rather than removing it.

Why did you retire from public service?

I retired from public service because of ill health, after serving as a Commissioner of Trade and Plantations. My public career had included appointments obtained through Lord Shaftesbury's recommendation, as well as exile and a return to England. During the last fourteen years of my life, I lived with Sir Francis Masham and Lady Masham. I died at Oates, Essex, in 1704. Ill health, rather than any further explanation I can offer here, was the reason for my withdrawal from public service.